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n his contribution to this edition of Just Labour, the central fault that 
Larry Savage finds with my championing the human rights nature of 
labour rights is that “the labour rights as human rights approach 
threatens to undermine class-based responses to neoliberal globalization by 
contributing to the depoliticization of the labour movement.” It has that effect 
Savage asserts because it “tends to downplay or altogether ignore the material 
dimension of collective worker action and the central role of economic conflict in 
the employment relationship” and because it “assumes that power flows from 
rights.”  
 I
Savage writes as if the “workers’ rights are human rights” theme is the 
creation of intellectuals musing in their ivory tower isolated from the struggles of 
workers and their organizations. Nothing could be further from the truth. The 
international labour movement itself has been a central force promoting the 
workers’ rights theme. 
In its 2004 report A Trade Union Guide to Globalisation, the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (now the International Trade Union 
Confederation) had this to say1: 
 
The fundamental concern of the trade union movement has been the struggle to 
secure the right of workers to form and join independent trade unions and to 
bargain collectively with their employers. This is the very basis of trade union 
organization and is still its highest priority. Defending trade unions and trade 
union rights under attack from any government is a main activity for the 
international trade union movement.  
 
The basic trade union rights are the right to form or join a trade union, the right 
to bargain collectively and the right to strike. These trade union rights are 
human rights (emphasis added) and, as all human rights, they are universal and 
indivisible. General rights for trade unionists are enshrined in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, its covenants as well as in most national 
constitutions and labour codes. For example, article 23 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights includes the following: ‘everyone has the right to 
form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.’ 
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The most important trade union rights are defined in the ILO conventions No. 87 
on freedom of association and No. 98 on the right to collective bargaining. 
 
International trade union organizations have been fighting since their inception 
to get these rights recognized by all governments and employers. Conventions 
No. 87 and No. 98 are integral parts of what is needed to combat the excesses of 
globalization (emphasis added): a strong set of labour standards securing the 
principal labour rights that can be used to confront the social actors with their 
responsibilities. (p.27) 
 
Workers’ rights as human rights do not “depoliticize” trade unions. 
Achieving acceptance and protection of workers’ rights as human rights is, as the 
statement above indicates, a top political priority of the labour movement. 
Achieving acceptance and protection of the human right to bargain collectively 
does not “downplay or altogether ignore the material dimension of collective 
worker action.” Collective bargaining is an essential element of the labour 
movement’s strategy to combat the negative effects of globalization on workers’ 
standards of living. Workers’ rights as human rights do not deny the “central 
role of economic conflict in the employment relationship.” Achieving acceptance 
of the human right to strike is essential to allow workers to confront economic 
injustice.  
In order for me to effectively respond to some of Savage’s additional 
criticisms it is first necessary to make some preliminary remarks about the 
Wagner Act Model Mode of Employment Regulation (WAM)2. As developed by 
French Regulation theorists, a mode of regulation is a pattern of thought and 
behaviour shaped by norms, habits, laws and other regulating networks3. 
Savage, along with most other Canadian experts on employment relations, are 
steeped in the ideas and concepts of WAM. They see the world through the 
prism of the Wagner Act Model. They interpret the Supreme Court’s recent BC 
Health decision constitutionalizing collective bargaining from the perspective of 
WAM. In my writings, however, Canadian employment relations are viewed 
through what might be designated the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) 
Mode of Regulation (I-Mode). I-Mode is not so much a set of practices on the 
ground as a vision of employment relations embedded in ILO conventions, 
jurisprudence, declarations and the promotional work of the ILO staff. WAM 
and I-Mode are not entirely at odds with each other. Indeed, much of what we 
do in Canada is consistent with I-Mode. On the other hand WAM contains bells 
and whistles that are not essential to I-Mode and some notions and practices that 
are entirely contrary to it. In a sense WAM and I-Mode have brought forth 
different languages or different dialects of the same language that make it 
difficult for speakers of one or the other to fully understand each other. Some key 
concepts, given the same name in both dialects, are defined quite differently. 
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Most fundamentally WAM and I-Mode differ on the definition of 
collective bargaining. According to the ILO, collective bargaining is defined as: 
 
…all negotiation which take place between an employer, a group of employers or 
one or more employers’ organizations on the one hand and one or more workers’ 
organizations on the other for determining working conditions and terms of 
employment, for regulating relations between employers and workers and for 
regulating relations between employers and their organizations and a workers’ 
organization or workers’ organizations4 
 
In Canada, on the other hand, we commonly consider collective 
bargaining to be something done by government-certified exclusive bargaining 
agents. Workers become “unionized” by certifying exclusive agents. Non 
certified employee associations that engage in a process that meets the above 
definition are considered something other than unions and the process in which 
they represent their members’ interests to their employer is considered to be 
something other than collective bargaining. The result is much confusion and 
discourse at cross-purposes. 
For example, according to Savage: 
  
Adams urges the labour movement to re-examine the appropriateness of the 
exclusive-agent certification model used to extend collective bargaining rights in 
Canada. Specifically, Adams advocates the development of a non-statutory 
unionism, characterized by independent non-union non-standard employee 
organizations operating alongside established labour unions. 
 
This statement is one of many in Savage’s essay that might be 
characterized as WAM-think. By interpreting my writing through notions 
inherent in the Wagner Act Model Savage misrepresents my argument. In none 
of my writings have I ever suggested that we abandon the exclusive-agent 
system in favour of “independent non-union, non-standard employee 
organizations.” What I have said is that, consistent with I-Mode, where Canadian 
workers have chosen not to certify an exclusive agent they retain their right to 
organize and bargain collectively through organizations of their choice 
independent of employer control. In I-Mode such organizations are “trade 
unions” not “non-union, non-standard employee organizations.” The WAM 
norm is to reserve for certified employee organizations the designation of 
“established labour union.” In order to be considered a legitimate union, an 
employee organization must be certified by the state. That is a notion that is, as 
the definition above indicates, alien to I-Mode and to most of the world’s labour 
movements. Indeed the notion that state-certification is necessary for union 
legitimacy is directly contrary to the notion of “free trade union.”   
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WAM fosters acceptance of the idea that employers have a right to retain 
complete control of the employment relationship if the relevant employees 
choose not to certify an exclusive agent. That is a notion that is thoroughly 
contrary to I-Mode. The end goal towards which the ILO is moving in its 
promotional work is independent collective representation for all workers with 
few exceptions. The norm under WAM is that workers should have a choice 
between exclusive agent certification and no representation at all. In short, WAM 
legitimizes no worker representation and thus complete employer control of 
employment as an option5. What I have been advocating, consistent with I-Mode 
and international human rights standards, is that the appropriate choice for 
Canadian workers is between exclusive agent representation and representation 
by non-statutory employee organizations that meet all of the international 
standards for being considered legitimate, independent unions. WAM imposes a 
particular brand of bargaining structure and process with representation by a 
particular sort of employee organization; I-Mode encourages workers to create 
any sort of employee organization they want within the bounds specified by 
international human rights standards and to negotiate with employers whatever 
bargaining structure and process they prefer again within the bounds of 
international standards.  
  In a further comment on this issue Savage says “Not only are such 
organizations lacking in the statutory strength of labour unions (note that, 
contrary to international concepts, Savage characterizes independent employee 
organizations as something other than labour unions), but they are often 
organized at the behest of employers in attempt to dissuade unionization.” From 
the perspective of I-Mode, any organizations that are set up at the behest of 
employers are not trade unions. They are not legitimate employee organizations 
at all. Employer controlled organizations are company unions and company 
unions are something quite different from independent, employee-controlled 
non-statutory unions. WAM blurs the distinction between company union and 
independent non-statutory union but in I-Mode the distinction is quite clear.  
Savage is critical of my example of the McMaster Faculty Association as a 
non-statutory union. He offers up the fact that several faculty associations have 
sought legal certification as evidence that my proposals are flawed. I totally 
disagree. Indeed, the history of unionization and collective bargaining in the 
Canadian university sector illustrates my argument very well. As I noted in 
“From Statutory Right to Human Right,” faculty and staff associations in the 
university sector generally began as non-statutory organizations. Over time there 
has been a movement towards certification because of the several advantages 
that certification offer to employee organizations. I have never denied those 
advantages. Indeed, I discuss them at some length in Labour Left Out. Nor have I 
ever discouraged employee organizations from moving towards certification if 
they consider that move to be advantageous. What I have argued is that a non-
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statutory relationship such as the one between the McMaster’s administration 
and the McMaster University Faculty Association (MUFA) is an option for those 
who prefer not to certify an exclusive agent.  
Shortly after I arrived at McMaster, MUFA established a committee, of 
which I was a member, to investigate the advisability of certifying the association 
as an exclusive bargaining agent. We recommended against it for several 
reasons. Maintaining an informal and collegial relationship with the 
administration was important to us and it was feared that certification would 
introduce a more distant and adversarial relationship. We wanted to be able to 
go to the administration at any time over issues we considered important but we 
feared that the WAM tradition of negotiating only at contract expiry while 
allowing management free rein during the course of the agreement would be to 
our disadvantage. Certification would have probably meant introducing the 
notion of management’s reserved rights into the relationship and we did not 
want to do that. Many McMaster faculty members wanted to retain their ability 
to negotiate individually over particular aspects of their relationship with the 
university. They did not want to give up their right to negotiate to an exclusive 
agent.  
In short, we considered that a non-statutory relationship had several 
advantages. However, we realized that our relationship depended on the 
continuing good will of university administrators. Should they turn tyrannical 
the advantages of non-certification would disappear. Our committee considered 
it prudent to prepare for the worse. We recommended that MUFA’s constitution 
be rewritten to ensure that the association met the legal definition of an 
independent union so that we could certify in a hurry should that course become 
necessary. As Savage notes, many faculty and staff associations have decided 
over the years to certify an exclusive agent largely because of dissatisfaction with 
the conduct of their administrations. Certification made sense in their particular 
situations. At McMaster, the so-called McMaster Model – which has been revised 
several times over the years – continues to function sufficiently well that the 
faculty have not considered it necessary to move to certification. For most 
McMaster faculty members the benefits of the Model continue to outweigh the 
costs. 
Certainly university faculty, as Savage notes, are not representative of the 
unorganized in Canada. But that observation is entirely beside the point it seems 
to me. The situation at McMaster illustrates a way in which employers and 
employees with good will on both sides may negotiate a satisfactory and 
enduring collective relationship without resort to government imposed structure 
and process. Were Canadian employers to recognize their moral duty, either 
voluntarily or under pressure from the state and the labour movement,  to 
recognize and bargain in good faith with employee associations the McMaster 
Model would, it seems to me, be broadly viable. Indeed, the negotiation of 
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bargaining structure and process by independently organized worker 
organizations is the industrial relations norm throughout much of the world (see, 
for example, Adams 1995b). In international perspective we are extraordinary as 
a society in the extent to which we have allowed government to define and 
constrain free collective bargaining.    
Survey evidence that I reported in Labour Left Out, suggests that nearly all 
Canadian workers want some version of representation in the establishment of 
their terms and conditions of work. Many are not yet ready to certify an 
exclusive agent.  However, those workers should be encouraged, I believe, to 
organize in whatever format they are comfortable. They should, consistent with 
international standards, be encouraged to negotiate an appropriate structure and 
process for bargaining their conditions with their employers. Employers should 
be pressured, again according to international standards, “voluntarily” to 
recognize and bargain in good faith with such organizations. Should employers 
continue to refuse recognition, governments should be exhorted to introduce 
legislation forcing them to behave in a manner consistent with international 
human rights standards. And finally, whether certified or not, all Canadian 
workers have a human right to strike and governments should, consistent with 
international standards, effectively protect that right.  
 Developing a strategy to meet those goals would be, it seems to me, much 
to the benefit of established Canadian unions. Instead of suffering the indignity 
of what was once referred to as wage slavery (selling subjugation to the will of 
another for a price), workers would gain experience in dealing democratically 
with their employers. Should their tailor-made arrangements falter they could 
move to certify. As have associations in the university sector, many of them 
would, no doubt, eventually seek to amalgamate with established unions. Were 
non-statutory unionism the norm in the private sector, union density, as defined 
in the traditional WAM manner, could be expected, through amalgamation, to 
expand significantly over time. It is almost certainly much easier to bring 
independent associations into the fold that it is to organize the totally 
disorganized. Indeed, the organization of the public sector in Canada is largely a 
story of employee associations converting into what are considered, in WAM-
think, to be genuine trade unions. Unfortunately, Canadian unions have 
expressed no interest whatsoever in pursuing such a strategy. They are 
steadfastly wedded to WAM and its benign acceptance of mass disorganization. 
The biggest losers are the 80+% of Canadian private sector workers whose status 
at work depends almost entirely on the paternal benevolence of the boss.  
Savage asserts that I am theoretically inconsistent in proposing that the 
right to strike is a fundamental human right while refusing to join with other 
prominent Canadian commentators in condemning the CAW-Magna deal under 
which the union agrees to forego the right to strike in favour of arbitration in 
return for the company agreeing not to oppose union efforts to organize Magna’s 
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workforce. That assertion is another product of WAM-think that is inconsistent 
with I-Mode. Under the international norms workers and unions have a 
fundamental right to strike but they also have the right to forego the strike in 
favour of arbitration if they consider that to be to their advantage6. I have some 
serious reservations about the specifics of the CAW-Magna deal but not from an 
international human rights perspective. The workers at Magna have choices. 
They may join CAW and thus forgo the strike-right in favour of arbitration; they 
may join another union and certify an exclusive agent; they may also set up a 
non-statutory union and negotiate through it an appropriate structure and 
process with Magna.  
What I do have a problem with, from an I-MODE perspective, is 
legislation that removes the right to strike and imposes arbitration in its stead. 
The international norms are clear that the only workers for which arbitration 
may be legislatively substituted for the right to strike are those whose 
withdrawal of work would endanger health and safety (Gernigon et al. 1998). 
The ILO has developed a very rich jurisprudence that identifies the jobs that 
qualify. It is a very restricted list. In Canada we blatantly offend the international 
standards by denying about 50% of public sector workers the right to strike and 
effectively denying that right to the uncertified in the private sector. Moreover, 
despite the indignation expressed about the CAW-Magna deal, Canadian unions 
are conflicted about their position with respect to arbitration. There has, for 
example, been no Magna-like outcry against the United Food and Commercial 
Workers’ proposal that agricultural workers’ legislation in Ontario should 
substitute arbitration for the right to strike.   
Savage is not happy with my positive reaction to the Supreme Court’s 
2001 Dunmore decision. He mistakenly asserts that the decision “struck down an 
Ontario law which prohibited agricultural workers from organizing into 
unions.” That is not what the law did. Instead, it removed agricultural workers 
from statutory protection7. The lack of statutory protection is not the same as 
prohibition. Prior to positive legislative protection introduced by an NDP 
government in the early 1990s agricultural workers in Ontario had the same right 
to organize as did Canadian workers generally prior to the introduction of the 
Wagner Act Model at the end of World War II. However, one of the 
misperceptions created by WAM is that the lack of legislated protection is 
equivalent to prohibition.  
 What the Supreme Court found to be unacceptable about the Ontario 
government’s initiative is that the removal of agricultural workers from statutory 
protection was accompanied by statements about the inappropriateness of 
collective bargaining for such workers. The government’s actions, in effect, 
created an atmosphere that made it, in the SCC’s words, “nearly impossible” for 
agricultural workers to organize. The SCC ordered Ontario to introduce 
legislation that secured agricultural workers constitutional rights.  
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In response, the Ontario government introduced an Act that it believed 
minimally met the constitutional standard. It explicitly stated that agricultural 
workers had a right to organize and develop a program of action to defend and 
forward their interests. It established that agricultural workers had a right to 
make demands on their employers and that the employers had a legal duty to 
recognize the worker representatives so that they might present their claims. The 
Agricultural Employees Protection Act (AEPA) was widely condemned by 
organized labour because it did not specifically require bargaining in good faith 
and because it did not impose any dispute resolution mechanism.  
Savage asserts that the Ontario Superior Court ruled that the Act did not 
violate the Charter because it provided agricultural workers with “adequate 
protection of their right to freedom of association.” But that is not what the court 
said. It said, instead, that the Act was consistent with Canadian constitutional 
law as that law stood after Dunmore when there was no constitutional duty to 
bargain and no right to strike8. In BC Health the SCC did establish a duty to 
bargain in good faith and, on appeal, it is likely that the Ontario government will 
be ordered to alter the AEPA accordingly.  
BC Health, as Savage notes, did not establish a right to strike. Nor did it 
overtly deny constitutional protection to that right. Instead the Court refused to 
pronounce on the right because the facts of the case did not concern that issue. 
However, if the Court remains true to its standard that Canadian workers are 
entitled, at a minimum, to rights embedded in international human rights 
treaties that Canada has ratified, it must grant constitutional protection to the 
right to strike (Fudge 2008). If that happens, the AEPA will have to be revised 
again and when it is it will protect the essential worker rights specified in 
international human rights law: the rights to organize, bargain collectively and to 
strike. 
Although in conformity with international standards, that regime will be 
considerably different from WAM in that there will be no certification and no 
requirement for the union to demonstrate majority support to be recognized. A 
revised AEPA illustrates just one of the options that Canada has in bringing its 
law and practice into line with the international standards to which the SCC says 
all Canadian workers are entitled. 
  According to Savage, in the BC Health case the SCC “was careful not to 
fully embrace the ILO’s conception of freedom of association.” He follows up 
that assertion by saying that “the Court suggested that the Charter only protects 
certain aspects of collective bargaining in certain contexts.” This is another mix-
up resulting from a confusion of WAM and I-Mode. The SCC did, in fact, 
strongly embrace the ILO’s conception of freedom of association. But the ILO’s 
conception is not the same as WAM’s conception.  
What the Court said is that not all aspects of collective bargaining, as that 
term is understood in Canada, are protected by the Charter. What the Court was 
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saying is that many aspects of Canadian collective bargaining are legislatively 
idiosyncratic and cannot be justified as deserving constitutional protection or as 
universal human rights. For example, a grievance procedure leading to binding 
arbitration is an essential feature of collective agreements in Canada. But 
grievance arbitration is not a human right or a constitutional right. As the revised 
AEPA example above illustrates, there are many ways to ensure fundamental 
worker rights. What the Court has said is that workers are entitled to have their 
basic rights protected but they are not entitled to any particular legal approach to 
providing that protection.  
Savage asserts that, in its BC Health decision, the SCC reaffirmed the 
“public policy environment of the post-war compromise.” But that is almost 
certainly what it did not do. Many aspects of WAM, in which the post-war 
compromise is supposedly embedded, are out of step with international norms. 
What BC Health apparently says is that those aspects of WAM will have to 
change. They will have to be brought in line with Canada’s international human 
rights obligations. If that is in fact what the courts will require in future, the 
result will be a new Mode of Regulation much different from WAM.  
As put forth in “From Statutory Right to Human Right,” I believe that the 
most sensible way forward is not to allow the courts to create, piecemeal, a new 
labour code but rather for labour, business and government to pro-actively 
negotiate a new Mode of Regulation that is both consistent with international 
norms and is also mutually satisfactory to all three of them. As documented in 
my Industrial Relations Under Liberal Democracy such grand deals were done in 
several European countries in the first half of the twentieth century. Although 
that would be the most sensible way to proceed, I am not at all optimistic that it 
will happen in the near future. At this point all three actors appear to be in a state 
of shock waiting for the next judicial bomb to go off. It may require several 
explosions before they are ready to negotiate.  
Although I disagree with much of Savage’s critique I agree with one of 
his fundamental points: “no constitutional document or international treaty, 
however progressive, can replace the need for sustained political struggle to 
protect and enhance workers’ rights.”  
Unfortunately Savage fails to appreciate that BC Health contains 
language that could be put to work to make significant gains for Canadian 
workers. In writing that decision the SCC was expansively laudatory of collective 
bargaining and its potential for helping to realize values that Canadians consider 
fundamental. Collective bargaining deserves constitutional protection, the Court 
said, because it “reaffirms the values of dignity, personal autonomy, equality and 
democracy that are inherent in the Charter.”  
Unions ought to be able to make use of that language to attack employer 
opposition to collective bargaining and to pressure governments to move off of 
their neutral stand towards support for collective bargaining. If collective 
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bargaining is a human right then opposing its institution is tantamount to 
opposing employment equity, or equal pay or the ban on child labour. The 
notion of the union-free workplace is as morally reprehensible as “separate but 
equal” and “a woman’s place is in the home.” Drawing on international human 
rights standards, the civil rights movement and the women’s rights movements 
were able to mount vigorous campaigns against those discredited notions. 
Eventually, court decisions and legislation helped turn things around. But 
without mobilization on the ground it is unlikely that the job would have gotten 
effectively done. Human rights ideals and rhetoric could help the labour 
movement mount a campaign that would drive the Wal-Marts of the world away 
from their defence of the union-free workplace just as it helped drive racist, 
sexist and homophobic notions from the field of respectable discourse. To date, 
however, no such campaign has emerged.  
Finally, I would like to express my thanks to Larry Savage for instituting 
this dialogue. If we are to have a productive exchange about the implications of 
workers’ rights at human rights we have to reach a common understanding 
about the differences between the way we think of labour issues here in Canada 
and the way they are conceived of by the international community. Hopefully 
this exchange will move us more quickly towards that goal than would have 
happened in the normal course of academic discourse. 
 
NOTES 
 
1.  Available online at http://www.icftu.org/pubs/globalisation/globguide.html  
2.  I first developed this concept in Adams 1995a. 
3.  On French Regulation theory see Adams 1992 and Lipietz 1987 
4.  Quoted in Adams 2003 
5.  This argument is developed more completely in Adams 2001 and 2007 
6.  For an excellent treatment of international standards as they impact Canadian and U.S. practices see 
Atleson, et al. 2008 
7.  On Dunmore see Adams 2003 
8.  The Superior Court decision - Fraser v. Ontario (Attorney General) – may be found online at 
http://www.lancasterhouse.com/decisions/2006/jan/OSCJ-Fraser.HTM. 
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